Elements of Deterrence

Classical deterrence theory developed in response to the nuclear threats of the Cold War. Strategists since have stretched it into new concepts such as "cross-domain deterrence" and "integrated deterrence" to encompass emerging threats in the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains. Whatever the problem, deterrence seems like the solution. But perhaps we are asking too much from it. 

If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then the diversity of means in modern warfare suggests a diversity of political effects. Some force structures and postures are useful for fighting particular kinds of wars. Others are effective for warning adversaries of consequences or demonstrating resolve. Still others may accomplish these goals at lower political cost, or with greater strategic stability. Deterrence strategy is not simply a matter of integrating various tools, therefore, but of figuring out why to use them in the first place. 

This book presents theoretical and empirical findings from a decade-long research endeavor on ''cross-domain deterrence'' sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense Minerva Initiative, building on a previous edited volume. We have since published a series of peer-reviewed articles on deterrence (together, separately, and with colleagues). Each of these articles has presented a portion of our reasoning, along with some empirical findings. Yet the respective strands have never been brought together in one place. This book accomplishes that and more. 

Elements of Deterrence presents newly revised and reorganized versions of published work alongside new material into a holistic framework for understanding how deterrence works (or fails to work) in multiple domains. We are especially grateful to our coauthors for their permission to include their work in this new format; they are credited on the byline of several chapters. The result is a new synthesis of the venerable problems of deterrence. We use a series of detailed theoretical and empirical studies to explore the fundamental political trade-offs that arise from integrating specialized military technologies for disparate strategic priorities. We find that in deterrence, all good things do not go together.